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We investigate the role that climatic change has played in the pattern of urbanization in 
sub-Saharan countries compared to the rest of the developing world.  To this end we 
assemble a cross-country panel data set that allows us to estimate the determinants of 
urbanization.  The results of our econometric analysis suggest that climatic change, as 
proxied by rainfall, has acted to change urbanization in sub-Saharan Africa but not 
elsewhere in the developing world.  Moreover, this link has become stronger since 
decolonization, which is likely due to the often simultaneous lifting of legislation 
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* The views expressed by the authors are not necessarily those of the institutions they are affiliated with.  Section I: Introduction 
It has been noted that historically economic development and urbanization have 
tended to go hand in hand and the legitimacy of this link continues to draw considerable 
attention; see, for instance, the 1999/2000 issue of the World Development Report 
(World Bank, 2000).  One notable exception to this stylised fact, however, has been sub-
Saharan Africa.  More specifically, while sub-Saharan Africa’s rate of urbanization has 
been extraordinary by international standards, growing by more than 140 per cent 
between the 1960s and the 1990s - which is a rate of ten times that of OECD countries 
and 2.5 times that of the rest of the developing world – it does not appear to have been 
coupled with an improvement in economic wealth in this region of the world; see Fay 
and Opal (2000) and World Bank (2000).
 1 Furthermore, it is now a well known fact that 
internal migration has been a major factor fuelling the growth of Africa’s cities. For 
example, it has been estimated that rural-urban migration has accounted for roughly half 
of urban growth in Africa between the 1960s and 1990s (Zachariah and Conde (1981), 
Kelley (1991)), with large variations across countries. These evolutions and further 
predicted increases in urbanization have consequently raised concerns about the capacity 
of Africa’s urban system to absorb such massive movements of population and its 
impact on sustainable development.  
A natural starting point in trying to understand the lack of connection between 
urbanization and development in sub-Saharan Africa is to analyse the potential 
determinants of urbanization on this continent.  From the general literature on what 
causes urbanization, one can essentially distinguish between two groups of explanations 
of rural-urban movements, which we loosely label as demand pull and supply push type.  
With regard to the former, it is generally assumed that modern sectors of production, 
                                                 
1 Moreover, according to UN (2003) projections, sub-Saharan Africa’s urbanization should further increase 
by about 3.5 per cent annually in the next 30 years. 
  2which generally locate in urban areas, have higher rates of productivity and monetary 
reward than the traditional rural agricultural sector and hence attract urban-rural 
migrants.  Supply-push explanations, in contrast, essentially refer to the possibility that 
other factors directly affecting the rural sector have favoured population movements 
towards cities and may not necessarily result in productivity improvements. These may 
include displacement of population due to civil conflicts or other more direct 
determinants of agricultural production.     
One particular supply-push type factor that may have been important in 
determining urbanization in Africa, and that is the focus of the current paper, is that of 
climate change. In particular, long-run climate change scenarios tend to suggest that 
extreme climate variations and, more specifically, water shortages, are likely to cause 
abrupt changes in human settlements and urbanisation patterns in sub-Saharan Africa 
more than anywhere else in the world, see Watson et al. (1998). It has also relatively 
recently been noted that rainfall in Africa has, in general, been on a decline since its 
relative peak in the 1960s; see, for instance, Nicholson (1994, 2001). The specific effects 
of climate change on rural/urban migration in sub-Saharan Africa have, however, as of 
date been poorly documented. A particularly important starting-point is that sub-Saharan 
African agriculture is especially dependent on rainfall compared to most other 
developing countries which triggers the potential impact of rainfall variations on 
economic activity, see Barrios et al. (2003). These impacts are, in turn, especially 
pronounced in rural areas where agriculture concentrate and thus potentially affect 
rural/urban migration patterns. In this regard, one should note that, although climate per 
se is seldom the direct root of migration, except in extreme cases like floods or droughts, 
it clearly can, however, exacerbate difficult living conditions at the margin of subsistence.  
  3The current paper provides empirical evidence showing that climatic change have 
been an important determinant of rural-urban migration in sub-Saharan Africa. More 
generally, our focus is linked to the concept of eco-refugees or environmental refugees, where 
environmental conditions may influence socio-economic conditions and hence migration 
(Myers, 1993).
2, 
3 We specifically set out to investigate the role of the general decline in 
rainfall on the African continent since the 1960s in shaping its urbanization patterns.  In 
this regard we take advantage of a new comprehensive cross-country data set on rainfall 
and commonly used United Nations data on urbanization. Placing these in an 
econometric specification of the determinants of urbanization we then explicitly test for 
the impact of rainfall on urbanization in sub-Saharan Africa using other developing 
countries as a natural control group.  Our results show that rainfall has indeed been an 
important determinant of urban growth in sub-Saharan Africa. Moreover, we find that 
this effect was much stronger after decolonisation when there was less restriction on 
migration in most countries.   
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In section 2, we discuss 
Africa’s rural sector’s vulnerability to shortages in rainfall. In section 3, we outline a 
simple theoretical factor specific framework to demonstrate how rainfall may affect 
urbanization patterns.  Section 4 describes our data and provides summary statistics. Our 
econometric framework and estimation results are presented in section 5. Concluding 




                                                 
2 The term was actually first popularised by Lester Brown of the Worldwatch Institute in the 1970s, but 
perhaps the most quoted contributions on the subject are those of El-Hinnawi (1985) and Jacobson (1988). 
3 Although difficult to estimate, the number of environmental refugees ranges worldwide  from 10 to 25 
millions (Myers, 1993). 
  4Section II: The Link between Rural-Urban Migration and Rainfall: A Specific 
Factors Framework 
The specific factors model (Jones, 1971) is a particularly useful theoretical 
framework in order to conceptualize the link between rural/urban migration and changes 
in rainfall. Here we use a slightly modified version of this model in order to consider the 
effect of variations in rainfall in the agriculture sector. Accordingly, suppose we have an 
economy that has two industries, the rural/agricultural sector (A) and the 
urban/manufacturing sector (M), and three factors of production, “effective” land input 
(L), labor (N), and capital (K). Here, land is speciﬁc to the agricultural sector whereas 
capital is speciﬁc to the manufacturing sector, and labor is supposed to be freely mobile 
between the two sectors. Thus, the production function in the rural/agricultural and the 
urban/manufacturing sectors are  
             ( 1 )   () ,
1 A A
A A N R L Y
α α − =
M M
M M N K Y
α α − =
1          ( 2 )  
where  K stands for capital endowment of the economy and  A α ( M α )  is the elasticity of 
agriculture (manufacturing) output with respect to labour. Unlike the standard speciﬁc 
factors model, we assume that the effective land input depends on the level of rainfall 
(R), that is, L(R). In order to see the positive impact of rainfall on the effective land 
input, we assume L’(R)>0. We also assume that the economy is small in the sense that 
prices of the two sectors,  A p  and  M p , are exogenously given.  
For simplicity we postulate that both the agricultural and the manufacturing sectors 
exhibit constant returns to scale technologies. In this case, first order conditions lead to 
the following results: 
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where NA/NM is the mass of workers in the agricultural/manufacturing sector. 
From equations (3) and (4) and the labor market equilibrium condition,  N N N M A = + , 
we have the equilibrium wage rate and the equilibrium distribution of workers between 
the two sectors { }
* * * , , M A N N w , as functions of the parameters  ( ) { } M A p p K R L , , , . The 
equilibrium urbanization rate is given by  N N U M
* ≡ . 
In order to analyze the impact of rainfall on urbanization, we first have to determine the 
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Taking the rate of change in the labor market equilibrium condition, we have 










U ,         ( 7 )  
 
where we abstract from the growth in the labor force. From equations (5), (6), and (7), 
we derive the following proposition. 
 
  6Proposition: A decline in rainfall raises the urbanization rate. Specifically, the elasticity of the 































.       (8) 
where  N N A A = θ  and  N NM M = θ  are the shares of rural/agricultural and 
urban/manufacturing population respectively. The impact of a change in rainfall can in 
fact be assimilated to the change in factor endowment à la Rybczynski showing how 
changes in an endowment affects sectoral outputs. Here a similar effect can help to 
better understand the linkages between changes in productivity of the input specific to 
agriculture (i.e. land) through changes in rainfall and changes in the urbanization rate 
through change in the relative share of manufacturing versus agriculture employment. 
 
Section III: The Rainfall Dependence of sub-Saharan African Agriculture 
The dependence of sub-Saharan agriculture on rainfall and its implications for 
Africa’s economic development has been widely documented in the literature. The 
present Section summarizes this literature and more extended discussion can be found, 
for instance in Barrios et al. (2003) and IPCC (2001). Changes in rainfall can potentially 
have a wide array of economic implications anywhere in the developing world given that 
rainfall is the main driver of water balance variability both over space and time. 
Historically, however, shortages in rainfall in Africa seem to have been associated with 
particularly damaging consequences, in the most extreme cases causing food and water 
deficiencies and the death and displacement of substantial shares of population. Part of 
the reason of why shortages in rainfall have been important for Africa is certainly due to 
the importance of the agricultural sector in its economies.  Table 1 shows, for example, 
  7that agriculture has traditionally had a higher share in GDP in Africa than in any other 
developing regions – nearly 40 per cent in 1960. Although this share has since been 
steadily decreasing, it still represents almost a third of total GDP in 1997, compared to 
the average 14.1 per cent in the rest of the developing world. In particular, African 
agriculture relies heavily on rainfall for the provision of water for crops. Indeed, 
compared to other developing areas in the world, a much smaller proportion of cropland 
is irrigated. More generally speaking, the geographic and climatic conditions specific to 
the African continent explain to a great extent why agriculture in sub-Sahara Africa is so 
vulnerable to water shortages. 
Generally speaking, agriculture in the African tropical area is seriously hampered 
by high temperature, fragile soils, and low yield potential. It also suffers from chronic 
diseases affecting both animal and non-animal production. Outside its equatorial area, a 
large share of Africa’s arable land suffers from aridity, tending to increase the risk of 
drought as drier soil absorbs more rainfall, see Bloom and Sachs (1998).
4 The 
vulnerability to rainfall in the arid and semiarid areas of the continent also translates into 
a poor capacity of most African soils to retain moisture. Furthermore, evapotranspiration 
is in turn relatively high in Africa, as a consequence of high temperature throughout the 
year, thus leaving low quantities of water for soil moisture. 
5  The reduction of vegetative 
cover experienced by Africa over the past decades has also added to the insufficient 
inter-annual soil water storage, see UNEP (1997). Land-surface and atmosphere 
conditions may thus interact positively as a feedback mechanism leading to a further 
decrease in precipitation. 
                                                 
4 Today, around 60 per cent of African countries are considered to be vulnerable to drought and 30 per 
cent extremely so, see Benson and Clay (1998). 
5 Evapotranspiration is the combination of water that is evaporated and the one that is transpired by plants 
as a part of their metabolic process. 
  8Agricultural practices often add to the water shortage problem in Africa more 
than anywhere else due to differences in property rights. More precisely, because farmers 
are often not owners of the land they work on the preservation of natural resources is 
often viewed as a secondary objective. In addition, pressures represented by increasing 
populations and changing technology add to the problem of land deterioration related to 
agricultural practices, see for example Drechsel et al. (2001). Problems associated with 
land use through, for example, deforestation, can translate into increased erosion. 
Another illustration of environment-damaging agricultural practices is the intense use of 
fertilizer in low-quality lands. As yields increase, so will water consumption, thus creating 
a vicious circle, see Gommes and Petrassi (1996). This causes greater exposure to 
desertification with the shortages in rainfall directly influencing agricultural productivity. 
Human practices can also add to the desertification risks through overgrazing, which is 
represented by higher density and/or shorter rotations of livestock beyond the limit of 
the ecosystem, in particular because range-fed livestock are usually concentrated in the 
arid and semi-arid areas since tropical areas provide potentially more exposure to animal 
diseases, see IPCC(2001).  
This high vulnerability of agriculture on climatic conditions in turn opens the 
door to the possibility of large-scale migrations of those whose livelihood essentially 
depends on rain-fed agriculture, the so-called environmental migrants, that have partly 
converged to cities.  As a matter of fact, in sub-Saharan African countries, urban growth 
has essentially been achieved through in-migration of agricultural populations, where 
nearly half of Africa’s urbanization in the last decades has been achieved by rural-urban 
migration, although there have been large variations across countries (Kelley, 1991).  
  
  9Section IV: Data and Summary Statistics 
Rainfall Data 
The basic hypothesis of the paper poses that climatic conditions push people out of 
rural/agricultural areas to urban areas. Our measure of climatic condition will be the 
rainfall level in a country and is taken from the Inter-Governmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) data set, which provides, amongst other things, times series data on the 
average annual rainfall for 289 ‘countries’ (comprised of 188 states and 101 islands and 
territories) from 1901 to 1998; see Mitchell et al (2002) for a complete description of the 
data set. These rainfall series were constructed by assimilating measurements of rainfall 
from meteorological stations across the world into 0.5 degree latitude by 0.5 degree 
longitude grids covering the land surface of the earth. Each grid-box was then assigned 
to the appropriate country in order to calculate a measure of rainfall for each by using the 
weighted mean of the values of all grid boxes within a country.
6 This procedure resulted 
in comparable mean measures, given in millimetres per square meters, of annual rainfall 
for each country.
  For the purposes of this paper we use observations on developing 
countries, where we consider a country to be of developing status if it is either a low, 
lower-middle, or upper-middle income nation according to the World Bank 2001 
definition.  All countries used in any part of our empirical analysis are listed in Appendix. 
There are a number of issues to be noted in terms of constructing and using the 
cross-country measure of annual rainfall.  First, we chose to normalise the rainfall 
measure provided in the data set by the long-term mean annual rainfall in each country.  
This was primarily done because we are interested in climatic changes, rather than 
permanent cross-country climatic differences in levels.  In order to avoid any concerns 
                                                 
6 Where a grid box was located across more than one country, the grid box was assigned to the country 
with the largest stake, except where a country would otherwise have been left without any grid box. 
Weighting was essential since the spatial areas represented by each grid box differ in latitude. For further 
details see Mitchell et al (2002). 
  10regarding the exogeneity of this normalisation factor we used the mean of the annual 
rainfall for the period prior to 1960, although using the long-term mean over the entire 
available period produced very similar results.
7  One should note that a similar measure is 
also used by the FAO; see Gommes and Petrassi (1996).  Since most of our econometric 
analysis focuses on the effect of rainfall on long-term, five year, cross-country growth 
rates, we calculated the simple arithmetic mean of the annual normalised rainfall measure 
over the appropriate five year intervals. 
One other aspect with regard to our rainfall measure that deserves discussion, 
because it has plagued many studies examining other potential determinants of Africa’s 
poor growth performance, is the question of its exogeneity.  In terms of rainfall we can 
argue fairly confidently that it is a strictly exogenous factor given that it measures an 
aspect of climatic change.  While one could in theory also hypothesize that perhaps 
economic activity affects such aspects as environmental degradation and desertification, 
and thereby possibly rainfall, Nicholson (1994) finds no evidence suggesting such.  As a 
matter of fact, earlier historical data suggests that rainfall naturally moves through long 
cycles of relative troughs and peaks, and that a cycle similar to the present one seems to 
have occurred in the 19th century, see Nicholson (2001).   
Finally, one should note that our measure of rainfall only offers a countrywide 
measure of precipitation.  Clearly, however, particularly in large countries there may be 
considerable variation even within national boundaries and constraints on growth may 
thus be due to logistical problems of redistribution.  Given the lack of data, we 
unfortunately have to abstract from any intra-country climatic variation. Having said this, 
one must remark that this is a problem inherent of all cross-country empirical analysis. 
                                                 
7 Details are available from the authors. 
  11Figure 1 depicts the long-term trends in our normalised rainfall measure for sub-
Saharan African countries. As can be seen, while variable, the mean rainfall in sub-
Saharan countries remained roughly constant during the first part of the 20th century 
until the 1950s, peaking in the late 1950s. However, since this peak, rainfall has been on a 
clear downward trend.  As a matter of fact, apart from a peak in 1980, mean rainfall has 
been for the most part lower than during the first 60 years of the century. These trends 
suggest that there has been an important climatic change in SSA since about roughly the 
late 1970s.  Figure 2 shows, in contrast, that average annual rainfall in non sub-Saharan 
developing countries displays no such trend. 
Urbanization 
Our source to construct the urbanization data stems from the UN World 
Urbanization Prospects (2003), where urbanization is defined as the share of population 
living in cities and for which information is given over five year periods.  Figures from 
the UN World Urbanization Prospects reveal that urban population growth rates in sub-
Saharan African countries have been steadily above those of the rest of the developing 
world over the past half century. For example, in 2000 Africa’s urbanization rate attained 
37 per cent (UN, 2003), corresponding to an average annual urban population increase of 
4.4 per cent, compared to 2.5 in the rest of the developing world, between 1950 and 
2000, highlighting hence the largest rate of urban development of all regions in the 
world. 
Other Data 
In terms of controlling for other potential determinants of urbanization in our 
econometric modelling we chose a set of covariates that are standard in the literature 
studying the determinants of urbanization (Ades and Glaeser (1995), Brueckner (1990), 
Davis and Henderson (2003), Gugler (1982) among others).  First, we use the size of a 
  12country’s population and this measure interacted with land area since for a given 
population, a larger land area reduces population density, and thus influences transport 
within the country, which in turn might impact on urbanization through standard 
forward/backward linkages (Krugman and Livas Elizondo, 1996). Information 
measuring these two variables is derived from the World Penn Tables (WPT) and the 
World Development Indicators, respectively. It has also been argued that openness to 
international markets is intrinsically linked to urbanization as countries with higher shares 
of trade in GDP rarely have their population concentrated in a single city. The rationale 
for this is that, given that imported goods are not cheaper in large cities, consumers 
spread over space to save on congestion costs (Ades and Glaeser (1995)). We thus also 
control for openness using the measure contained in the WPT.   
In the endogenous growth literature, a close connection between urbanization 
and national economic growth has been recognized (see for instance Lucas (1988)). 
Although the causality has been subject of intense debates, it is a well-admitted fact that 
sustained economic growth has always been accompanied by urbanization. In their panel 
data study, McCoskey and Kao (1998) have for instance shown that a long run 
relationship between urbanization, output per worker and capital per worker cannot be 
rejected on a sample of 30 developing countries. We thus add a measure of GDP/capita 
as a control regressor in our specification. 
More recently, it has also been shown that civil wars within a country and 
bordering countries can influence differences in rates of economic development across 
countries (Murdoch and Sandler, 2002), and that during periods of armed conflicts one 
can usually observe increases in urban immigration because people often seek safety and 
try to escape famines in well-supplied urban areas (Berhanu and White, 2000). As a proxy 
for this we use the measure of civil wars constructed by Murdoch and Sandler (2002). 
  13Finally, Barro (1999) has shown that there is a negative link between urbanization and 
democracy. Non-democratic institutions may disfavour urbanization on the ground that 
cities make it easier for people to meet and communicate. As Weber (1922) already 
noted, city air makes one free. Conversely, assembling people makes it easier for an autocrat 
to monitor and control the people, and as a corollary, more democratic institutions 
would then facilitate displacement of people through migrations, among others rural-
urban migrations. We use the POLITY database to account for democracy.
8  
Summary Statistics 
Using available data on rainfall and the other control variables listed above left us 
with a sample of 78 developing countries, of which 36 are sub-Saharan African (SSA) 
and the remainder are non-sub-Saharan African (NSSA), for five-year periods over the 
years1960-1990.  One should note that because even within this common time period of 
all our main variables used in our analysis there was not data available for all countries in 
any given five year segment and hence that our panel data set is of an unbalanced nature.   
Summary statistics of all our explanatory variables across the two groups are 
given in Table 2.  Accordingly, one finds, as would be expected, that urbanization is 
lower in SSA than elsewhere.  One should also note that normalised rainfall is lower, 
compared to rainfall figures in NSSA nations.  In terms of the other variables, one 
discovers that SSA countries are poorer, but have greater openness. Also, while they are 
less democratic, they have nevertheless experienced less civil wars.  Moreover, the 
summary statistics on population size and land area suggest that African countries are 
much less populated and have lower population densities on average.   Finally, during our 
sample period there were more periods of colonialization in SSA than in NSSA. 
                                                 
8 While there have been some other variables that have been used in the literature to explain cross-country 
differences in urbanization rates, inclusion of these, where available, would have put severe restrictions on 
the number of countries and extent of time span for each in our sample.   
  14Section V: Econometric Results 
In order to validate the basic hypothesis of the paper, we run parametric 
estimations examining the determinants, including climatic change, of urbanization. In 
particular, we estimate 
Uit = α + βXit + δRit + λt + µi + εit          ( 9 )  
 where U is the log of urbanization rate, R is our primary explanatory variable, i.e., log of 
rainfall, X is a vector of other time varying potential determinants, λ are year specific 
effects common to all countries, µ are time invariant country specific effects possibly 
correlated with other explanatory variables, ε and is the usual error term.  In order to 
purge the effects of µ, i.e., all time invariant determinants, from (9) we, as is common in 
cross-country studies with time dimension, use a fixed effects estimator.  
  Our results of estimating (9), first without including our proxy for climatic 
change, are shown in the first column of Table 2.   As can be seen, only openness and 
democracy play significant roles in determining the rate of urbanization.   In this regard, 
one should note that both are in line with a priori expectation, i.e., economies that are 
more open also have higher rates of urbanization, while democracy encourages lower 
urbanization.  In the second column of the same Table we subsequently included our 
measure of climatic change, i.e., rainfall.  The negative and highly significant coefficient 
on this proxy provides strong support for our main hypothesis embodied in (9), where, 
accordingly, decreases in rainfall encourage migration to urban areas.   The size of the 
coefficient suggests that a one-percent fall in normalised precipitation induces 
urbanization to rise by 0.45 percent.  
  In order to investigate whether the negative relationship between urbanization 
and rainfall is different across SSA and NSSA nations as we argued in Section III, we 
  15interacted our rainfall measure with a SSA dummy, as shown in the third column of 
Table 2.  The fact that this renders rainfall on its own insignificant, but produces a 
negative and significant coefficient on the interaction terms, suggests that on average 
there has only been an effect of rainfall on urbanization in SSA countries.   This result 
can be explained, as suggested in Section III, by the very different geographic, cultural 
features and also agriculture practices specific to SSA.  One may also want to note that 
the coefficient on the interaction term is substantially larger than that found on rainfall 
on its own in the specification without the interaction term.   As a robustness check we 
also separated out our total sample into SSA and NSSA sub-samples and re-ran (9) for 
these separately.  Importantly, this allows both coefficients and the error generating 
process to be different across these country groups. As can be seen, this qualitatively 
confirms our results for the pooled sample – rainfall only has a significant effect for the 
SSA group although one may want to view the results with some caution since, 
particularly for SSA, it restricts sample size considerably.     
One potentially important aspect neglected thus far is that, during colonial times, 
native Africans were often forbidden to live permanently in cities of eastern and southern 
Africa (O’Connor, 1983). More precisely, during the colonial period, certain laws kept 
most Africans from residing in the white European cities in many areas of Africa. Partly 
as a consequence of this, in the 1950s, Africa was the least urbanized region of the world, 
with roughly 15 per cent of its inhabitants living in urban centers, compared to figures 
above 30 per cent in the rest of the developing world and around 60 per cent in the 
developed countries.  These strict prohibitions disappeared after independence except in 
South Africa.
9 Thus, when the African colonies obtained their independence, migration 
                                                 
9 The case of South Africa is of particular interest. It gained its independence in 1910, but segregation laws 
continued to persist, especially after the adoption of the policy of apartheid in 1948. During the 19th 
century, separate villages for African and colored people were established in the smaller towns. Official 
segregative tendencies were given a boost by the outbreak of bubonic plague in Cape Town and Port 
Elizabeth in 1901, with the establishment of new state-controlled African locations several kilometres from 
  16to cities increased sharply, changing the racial composition of cities and leading to rapidly 
mounting urban populations. Following a catch up movement, urbanization accelerated 
rapidly after independence with mass movement of population away from the rapidly 
deteriorating agricultural sector and the fall in world raw commodity prices in the early 
1980s (Miller and Singh, 1994).  
Given that part of the time series used here captures times of decolonialization, 
particularly in SSA, we have further investigated the possibility that rainfall’s impact on 
urbanization in SSA countries may have changed for some countries in our estimations.  
In order to do so, we have interacted a decolonization dummy jointly with the SSA 
dummy and the rainfall variable in the last column of Table 2.
10  Moreover, in order to 
ensure that we are not just capturing other factors that altered with colonial 
independence, we also appropriately included the dummy on its own, its interaction with 
rainfall, and its interaction with the SSA dummy.  Firstly, the coefficient of the 
interaction term with the SSA dummy suggests that urbanization in SSA increased 
significantly after countries became independent as one would naturally expect following 
the discussion above.  More importantly, however, while the coefficient on the 
interaction term between the sub-Saharan African dummy and rainfall remains negative 
and statistically highly significant, the coefficient on the interaction term of the 
decolonization dummy, the SSA dummy, and rainfall also displays a statistically 
significant negative coefficient.  This implies that in times of independence, rainfall has 
had a reinforced impact on internal migration towards cities. This result, in turn, is 
consistent with the argument according to which decolonization has allowed greater 
internal movement of individuals, in response to climatic conditions. 
                                                                                                                                            
the centers of the two cities (Swanson, 1977). This in turn drastically limited the pace of urbanization in 
South Africa. 
10 The information for constructing the decolonialization dummy was taken from the CIA factbook, 
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/ 
  17Section VI: Conclusion 
In this paper we have examined whether climatic change in terms of decreasing 
trends in rainfall may provide some explanation towards the very different urbanization 
patterns that have taken place in sub-Saharan Africa compared to other developing 
countries over the last several decades.   Our analysis suggests that indeed this has been 
the case.  Specifically, we find that while shortages in rainfall have acted to increase rates 
of urbanization on the sub-Saharan African continent, there is no evidence of such for 
the rest of the developing world.  Moreover, our analysis suggests that this link was 
reinforced after colonial independence of sub-Saharan African countries, which often 
resulted in the simultaneous lifting of legislation prohibiting the free internal movement 
of native Africans. 
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Appendix: Country list in regressions 
Sub-Saharan African countries  Non Sub-Saharan African developing 
countries 
Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, 
Burundi, Cameroon, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Côte 
d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, 
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, 
Mauritius, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, 
Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, 
Togo, Uganda, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Bolivia, 
Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, 
Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Jamaica, 
Jordan, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, 
Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New 
Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, 
Romania, Sri Lanka, Syria, Thailand, 
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Table 1: Mean agricultural shares for SSA and NSSA 
   1960 1970 1980  1990  1997
% of Agriculture in GDP:         
 NSSA 24.4 23.0 18.7 16.3 14.1
 SSA  39.2 33.9 32.0 29.9 29.7
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
  Sub-Saharan African countries  Developing countr es other than 
Sub-Saharan African 
  i




urbanization  0.199 0.123  0.416  0.187 
population  8472.855 12019.2  55766.03  159888.9 
area  541495.6 504171.4  1055924  1940881 
GDP/capita  1707.25 1595.866  3384.847  2071.8 
openness  72.986 52.982  56.389  48.322 
democracy  2.055 2.925  3.784  3.483 
civil war  0.112 0.316  0.143  0.351 
rainfall  1062.399 490.978  1450.883  902.890 
decolonization  0.949 0.220  0.837  0.370 
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Table 2: Urbanization and rainfall 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
log (population)  0.195 0.211 0.217  -0.224  0.025  0.180 
  (0.301) (0.291) (0.287) (0.553) (0.204)  (0.283) 
log (population)* log (area)  0.020 0.017 0.013 0.038  0.014  0.009 
  (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.038) (0.015)  (0.021) 
log (GDP/capita)  -0.038 0.005 0.024  0.185*** 0.043  0.015 
  (0.041) (0.040) (0.040) (0.064) (0.033)  (0.039) 
openness  0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000  0.001*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
democracy  -0.015*** -0.014*** -0.013*** -0.017 0.001  -0.008* 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.011) (0.003)  (0.005) 
civil war  -0.029 -0.035 -0.029 0.027  -0.032*  -0.027 
  (0.029) (0.028) (0.028) (0.055) (0.019)  (0.027) 
log (rainfall)   -0.447*** -0.143  -0.306** -0.079  -0.090 
   (0.088)  (0.126)  (0.155)  (0.070)  (0.131) 
log(rainfall)*SSA     -0.589***     -0.396** 
     (0.177)      (0.197) 
decolonization         0.209 
         (0.320) 
decolonization*SSA         2.577*** 
         (0.756) 
decolonization* log(rainfall)         -0.032 
         (0.048) 
decolonization*rainfall*SSA         -0.335*** 
         (0.110) 
Time dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  442 442 442 197  245 442 
Countries  All All All  SSA  NSSA  All 
Number of Countries  78 78 78 36  42  78 
F-Test  65.26*** 66.13*** 63.65*** 50.33*** 49.33*** 56.31*** 
R-squared  0.006 0.006  0.24  0.07 0.004  0.21 
Notes : dependent variable is log(urbanization). SSA and NSSA refer to sub-Saharan respectively non sub-
Saharan African countries. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 1, 5, and 10 per 
cent significance levels. 
 























(mean) rain_ssa: mean of normalised rainfall in SSA. 
 
Figure 2: Rainfall in Non Sub-Saharan African Countries – 























(mean) rain_nssa: mean of normalised rainfall in NSSA. 
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